This One’s for You: A Trilogy of Amorality
by Joel Marks
Published in Philosophy Now no. 97, July/August, 2013, page 52.
There is no such thing as right or wrong! Three years ago I
made my constant readers’ heads spin when I first made that announcement (“An
Amoral Manifesto,” issues 80 and 81). This was startling coming from me, not only
because the statement is startling in itself, but especially because, for an
entire decade, I had been writing a regular column for this magazine called
“Moral Moments,” in which I pressed home the importance of moral reasoning in
all facets of life. Now, suddenly, that was down the tubes!
Well, not really suddenly. For it was three years prior
to my public announcement that I had had my original “anti-epiphany,” realizing
that my commitment to morality was, despite my avowed atheism, itself a kind of
theism. I had only been a “soft atheist,” who, like most New Atheists, embraced
Socrates’s idea (from Plato’s Euthyphro
dialogue) that morality was independent of religion (because, even to
acknowledge God as good and just implied our ability to know what these
qualities were prior to knowing God). But now I realized that so-called secular
morality is also a religion, which is, if anything, on less secure ground than
traditional theism, because it purports to issue commands (moral obligations,
prohibitions, and permissions) without a commander (God). Thus I became a hard atheist, in the sense of denying
the existence of both God and morality, or in a word, an amoralist.
The
three-year silence preceding my announcement was due to my having to rethink
absolutely everything about my most fundamental ethical assumptions, both as a
professional philosopher and as a person. I was not only struck dumb by massive
uncertainty about how to proceed, but also, frankly, scared to utter some of my
new thoughts. The only way for me to work it all out was to write. And write I
did. In a matter of months I had composed a 100,000-word manuscript, whose
working title was Bad Faith: A Philosophical
Memoir. By the time I had finished that I was well on my way to finding my
“amorality legs.”
However, the resulting manuscript
turned out to be unpublishable, and for two reasons. One was that the work
combined autobiography with analytic philosophizing, thereby falling between
two stools. The other reason was that my philosophizing had been done in
blissful ignorance of an existing professional literature. It was only when I
came up for air after my months’-long immersion in figuring it all out for
myself that I noticed others who had written on the same subject, and in
particular Richard Garner, who is my soul mate in this regard.
So I
started all over again. I felt that it made obvious sense to begin by
thoroughly acquainting myself with the on-going discussion in my field. This
led me eventually to refine my original philosophizing in a new manuscript,
called Ethics without Morals. Because
this was a scholarly monograph, I was able to find a publisher for it. That
book appeared in print one year ago.
However, Ethics without Morals far from exhausted
the content of my earlier manuscript. For in the main Bad Faith had been not so much a treatise as a memoir. I believed I
had a compelling story to tell about what it actually “feels like” to undergo
such a radical transformation of one’s worldview.
But
furthermore, and more urgently, I believed I had a compelling idea to share
with others – not only fellow philosophical specialists, but also the general
public. I especially wanted to offer something to the many Philosophy Now readers who had been asking me for a more extensive
discussion of amorality than the occasional column permitted. Ethics without Morals did not fit that
bill for all of them, not only because of its specialist orientation, but
mainly because of its very high price (due to the publisher’s marketing it to
research libraries).
Therefore I
sat down to write yet another book, this one called It’s Just a Feeling: The Philosophy of Desirism. This is written
for a nonspecialist audience; and it serves as a kind of primer of amorality,
with some theory but with emphasis on how actually to live an amoral life. And
in order to get it out as quickly as possible, I simply published it myself at
CreateSpace/Amazon. This also made it possible to price the book to be within
easy reach of anyone who wanted to read it. The book is now available
everywhere as a paperback, and also as an eBook for Kindle.
Finally, I
have also brought out, again with CreateSpace/Amazon, the latest incarnation of
Bad Faith, now duly pared down to a
more truly memoir form, although of necessity still containing the kind of
dialectical arguing that was raging in my mind during that initial period.
Thus, a
trilogy of amorality: a monograph (Ethics
without Morals), a memoir/prequel (Bad
Faith), and a primer/sequel (It’s
Just a Feeling). One way to think about their complementarity is to
conceive Bad Faith as my effort to
persuade myself of amorality’s viability and virtues, Ethics without Morals as my effort to persuade my professional
colleagues, and It’s Just a Feeling
as my effort to persuade everybody else.
I hope that
I have now satisfied (if not sated!) everyone who has been intrigued by my
recent personal experience or the thesis I have been defending. And of course I
will continue to devote the occasional Ethical Episode to further amoral
ramblings.
P.S. There is now a fourth book to the ... tetralogy! To wit:
Hard Atheism and the Ethics of Desire: An Alternative to Morality.
London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
This book deals with theoretical fine points that needed to be further developed after the publication of Ethics without Morals.
P.P.S. And now a fifth book: Reason and Ethics: The Case Against Objective Value. New York and Abington, Oxon: Routledge, 2020.
P.S. There is now a fourth book to the ... tetralogy! To wit:
Hard Atheism and the Ethics of Desire: An Alternative to Morality.
London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
This book deals with theoretical fine points that needed to be further developed after the publication of Ethics without Morals.
P.P.S. And now a fifth book: Reason and Ethics: The Case Against Objective Value. New York and Abington, Oxon: Routledge, 2020.
Joel Marks is Professor
Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of New Haven and a Bioethics Center
Scholar at Yale University. His Website is www.docsoc.com