How to Avoid Road Rage

I was driving to the local post office today and traveling at the speed limit (or maybe a couple of mph over). Lo and behold I notice one car behind me ... right on my tail. I am pondering why on Earth the person is driving like that. And then the person (a woman, oddly enough [in my experience]) holds down her horn until she turns off on a side street.
    I was truly nonplussed.
    Fortunately I had the mental resource of amoralism to account for the whole thing. My analysis is that this person thought I had been doing something wrong. It wasn't just that she wanted me to go faster. How do I know the difference? By the horn-blowing, whose only purpose was to punish me. How do I know that? Because the driver only began to do it as she was about to turn off the road; in other words, it was a parting gesture, like a middle finger -- she was not doing it for the instrumental purpose of trying to get me to speed up (which is probably what the tail-gating was attempting to accomplish).
    This kind of event -- so common in countless guises -- explodes all the pretensions of morality. For the bottom line, it seems to me, is indeed that she wanted me to go faster. Transforming her desire into a judgment that I was doing something wrong is the way morality puffs up our desires in an effort to give them the advantage over other people's desires. The fact that, by common-sense morality, I was actually doing the right thing by staying close to the speed limit, and she was in the wrong for tail-gating and blowing her horn, just shows how infinitely malleable morality is to fit whatever our desires happen to be.
    I love it! This is how I avoid road rage ... by becoming fascinated by human psychology.

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