The Real Meaning of Atheism

Right off the bat I must acknowledge the error implicit in the title of this essay, since, at least according to my present thinking, any term, such as “atheism,” has multiple “real meanings.” So my actual topic is a particular idea that thinking about atheism for many years has led me to. The idea is that “There is no God” is shorthand for an array of claims about the nature of the universe over and above the assertion that there is no deity, bearded, many-armed, or otherwise.

            This idea was inspired by Mitchell Silver’s book, A Plausible God (Fordham University Press, 2006), a philosophical defense of atheism. Naturally in order to debunk something you’d better say what it is you are debunking. One definition Silver considers (although eventually rejects as inadequate) is of God as “whatever there is in nature that makes good things possible” (p.42). Now, that is not itself the idea I want to talk about, but it must have planted a seed; for over time I have found myself inveighing against the universe for not giving a damn about what happens to humans (or other animals) … and is that not precisely to presume the non-existence of God?

            Well, all right: The connection is not logical or necessary. There could still be a god who just doesn’t give a damn about us, even has an animus against us, or doescare about us but is not omnipotent or omniscient, or (when all else fails) “works in mysterious ways.” But such a god (or gods) is not what interests most of us today, I imagine. We want a Being who is master of the universe and has a special place for us in his/her/its heart. And when you get right down to it, we (or people like me) want a God who will assure us complete immunity from harm and suffering and give sense and meaning to everything and make sure everybody is happy (or, if not everybody, then that perfect justice is meted out) in the end.

            But such a God is out of the question. And my idea now is that such a God is ruled out because such an outcome is ruled out for us by the universe itself, God or no God. So for example, when I observe someone exhibiting some sort of surprise that things have not worked out (for her or someone else or even the whole world) the way she deeply hoped and desired they would, my comment (uttered or thought) is, “That is exactly what it means for there to be no God.”

            The reason this is not garden-variety atheism is that I don’t mean to be suggesting that the person in question is a believer of some “traditional” sort. This person might think of herself as agnostic or even atheistic. My point is that some sort of God-notion remains in her psyche, insofar as she harbors expectations of the sort that was now just dashed.

            Thus, for example, to think or assume that the continued existence of Homo sapiens depends on anything but sheer luck or our own intentional efforts to save or preserve ourselves … is to believe (or is tantamount to believing) in God. Indeed, even when I myself am “inveighing against the universe for not giving a damn about what happens to humans (or other animals),” I am, contrary to what I wrote above, displaying this implicit theism, for one does not inveigh against inanimate nature. 

            Another attitude that is not explicitly theistic but nevertheless manifests a belief in God implicitly is the thought that giving up morality will somehow put one at a disadvantage in dealing with bad people. This idea is truly muddled, yet pervasive in the human psyche. Thus, just yesterday when I was discussing my amoralist views with a friend, he expressed his skepticism of the wisdom of my ethics by remarking, “But what if somebody is trying to rape your daughter? Can you only say you don’t like that, or don’t want it to happen? But he does like it and wants it to happen. So what then?” To which I replied, “Why isn’t wanting something (or liking something, etc.) enough to motivate us effectively? For example, is it so difficult to imagine an amoral person who is filled with greed or avarice and thereby devotes himself fully to making money? It seems to me this could not be more common. So what is the mystery about supposing that you would be sufficiently averse to having your daughter raped that you would use any available means to trying to prevent it, whether you believed in God or right and wrong or not?

            “And suppose you did believe that what the attempted rapist was doing was wrong, but he – in the nature of the case – thought it wasn’t? Would this give you any greater leverage over his behavior? It seems to me to think it does is precisely what it means to believe in God … and in a rather complex way to boot. You seem to be suggesting or assuming that because something is wrong, the universe will somehow intervene on the side of justice; and, not only that, but the universe will intervene on behalf of your conception of justice (since the rapist has a different one). But all of that is absurd, isn’t it? Multiply so. And it seems to me to be equivalent to believing that there’s a good God in heaven who rights every wrong even here on Earth, plus that God is on your side. If there is any evidence at all relevant to these assumptions, it tends in the opposite direction, I would say.”

And that’s what I mean when I say I am an atheist.

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