My Amoralist Theory in 4 Points

1. I propose eliminating all moralist language and concepts and beliefs etc. not only from our utterances but also from our psyches and social institutions ... to the degree practicable and in conformity with our considered desires. (This position is sometimes called moral abolitionism.) We need not be PC about this, if only because the effort would be counterproductive. And I would never want to junk the Bible anyway … just as, analogously, I would never propose removing Huckleberry Finn or Oliver Twist or The Merchant of Venice from the canon.  

2. But where I go beyond other moral abolitionists is in offering an alternative to the eliminated moralism of speech and thought, and furthermore one that I argue would make the world a better place … that is, more to my (and I would like to think, anyone’s if they but reflected on the matter) considered liking. I have labeled the alternative “desirism” (though it might just as well be called “rationalism,” except that term has so many other uses. I have seen one other use of “desirism” too, but only for a moral theory).

            What exactly is desirism? It is the recommendation that in place of “one ought to (or should) or ought not to x” or “x is the right (or wrong) thing to do (or is permissible)” and other such locutions, we say (and think and feel) “I want to do x, and here’s why (or “y” – ha ha)” or “I recommend that you do x, and here’s why” and so forth.  

Similarly, in place of “x is a good thing,” desirism recommends that we say “I like x.”  

And even (this being the most extreme extension of the view, to be found in my most recent monograph, Reason and Ethics: The Case against Objective Value [Routledge, 2021]), in place of “x is true,” I recommend that we say, “I believe x, and here’s why” or “I disagree with you, and here’s why,” etc.

Note that the “and here’s why” is what makes this “rationalism” as well as “desirism.”

All the rest of the ethics of desirism is variations on that theme. I think it solves all the puzzles of ethics and even provides a roadmap to a better world (that is, one I and I think most people who thought about it and tried it out would prefer to the present, moralist world).

 3. Note that desirism is an ethics even though it presumes the “elimination” of morality. I think we can have something quite naturally called an ethics that is amoralist (hence the title of my first monograph on the subject, Ethics without Morals [Routledge, 2013]). I call it “starting off on the wrong foot” to think otherwise.

             So how do I pull this off? Very simply: I am recommending a way to live, behave, etc. I am not simply describing human psychology or its evolution. I am going beyond that to suggest that we would be happier if we lived desiristically. (Note: I have not yet explained what that means; that will be Item 4 below.) What makes this recommendation not a morality itself is that I am not insisting that one follow the recommendation or that one ought to in any categorical sense … but only in the hypothetical sense of “if you would like to live a happier life in a happier society.” And – this is a fine point -- I would also recommend avoiding use of the word “ought” even hypothetically (regarding which see my chapter “Beyond the Surf and Spray” in The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously, edited by Richard Garner and Richard Joyce [Routledge, 2019]).  

 4. Note also that my argument for desirism is empirical, although not exclusively scientific. Thus: Would people in fact be happier in a desirist world? I think so and can offer many observations from experience in support of that contention. But I do not rely on science to make my case. Oh, I will cite scientific work on occasion. But I do so as further corroboration and not as necessary for me to make my case. And nor, especially, do I believe that science could ever be a sufficient means to make case! (Regarding which point I recommend Thomas Pölzler’s Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences [Routledge, 2018]), despite his making a slightly rosier prognosis of science’s prospects in this area.)

            A neat instance of my general methodological point is my recent experience of reading Alfred Russel Wallace’s revelatory paper on evolution and natural selection. As much as I worship Darwin, I was genuinely astonished to read Wallace’s paper (just as Darwin must have been when it arrived in his mailbox). Whereas I find Darwin’s writing not always easy to understand, Wallace’s is crystal clear: I followed every word. And, so far as I can tell, Wallace makes the whole case in the space of a few pages, and uses examples from nature that are not necessarily novel.  

My point is not that the theory of evolution by natural selection is a priori (although of course many have argued that it is). I think it is an empirical theory… but in the exact same way a philosophical theory is. My view of the difference between philosophy and science (in broad brush) is simply that the former relies for its evidence on existing “data” whereas the latter generates new data to test its theories. As Wittgenstein put it, philosophy consists of “a series of reminders.” Those “reminders” are usually “empirical data” that are readily available to anyone sitting in their armchair and reflecting on everyday life, but they also encompass all the findings of past science. Thus Wallace and Darwin are philosophers insofar as they are supporting their theory with things already commonly known or known by specialists, and scientists insofar as they generated new data (by hothouse experiment or naturalist exploration and observation) for the purpose. 

The reason I think philosophy is more suitable to resolve meta-ethical questions than science is simply that I see no possible endpoint to the discussion or debate(s). Again I would point to Pölzler’s book as showing what would be required, which is beyond achieving in my view. I think the ideal is to do the two in concert … which any philosopher could do if they rolled up their shirt- or blousesleeves to research the relevant science and any scientist could do if they rolled up their shirt- or blousesleeves to research the relevant philosophy. (Pölzler recommends the method of so-called reflective equilibrium between the two.)

 But I also think, as an empirical fact, the average philosopher is better trained to understand scientific research than the average scientist is trained to understand philosophy. Two big advantages are that philosophers are trained in logic and they understand that no purported fact can ever be established without its component concepts being analyzed.

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