The Other in Ethics

My philosophical interlocutor M____ and I hold opposing views about the structural place of the “other” in ethics, that is: When a contemplated action will affect another person or persons or sentient being or beings for better or worse, how much weight should their desires or interests etc. carry in the agent’s deliberation and decision? For example: If you want to keep the temperature in the room at 70° F and the other occupant wants it at 65° F, and you have control of the thermostat, should you accord the other occupant’s preference equal weight to your own in deciding where to set it?

            It seems natural to do so in any deliberation meriting the designation of ‘moral’. However, I, contrary to M____, reject the very notion of morality. I propose in its place what I have called “desirism,” according to which an agent will act on the basis of their own desires after due deliberation. Note, by the way, that I also abstain from use of the word “ought” (or “should” or “must”), not only in recommending a specific course of action (e.g., Keep the temperature at 70) but also in putting forward desirism. I would advise the same, i.e., desirist, procedure for considering desirism itself: Adopt it, or not, after due deliberation.

            Now, it is trivially true that we do as we desire to do, so that aspect of desirism is unproblematic. But, according to the moralist, it is problematic for desirism because it appears to turn it into an empty ethics since it makes no prescription but only (at most) a prediction. A genuinely ethical prescription presumes that one might do otherwise than what is being prescribed (in other words, “ought” implies “cannot” as well as “can”), but it is impossible to do other than what one desires to do. Otherwise ethics would be superfluous and we only need psychology (or even just lexicography).

            But, I reply, desirism does make a prescription, namely, reflect before you act, or, in a word, be rational. (Again, however, this is only a desirist recommendation, not a moral command.) So it is not simply any old thing that one happens to desire that leads to genuinely desirist action, but only desire that has been rationally vetted. 

            With this refined understanding of the alternative I am offering to morality, let us return to the question at issue. M____ seems to be suggesting that desirism is a sort of egoism because it recommends only that you do what you desire and not what you and the other people who might be affected by what you do, desire. But it cannot be that by this M____ means that the agent is acting in accordance with only their own desire, since, as we have seen, it is trivially true that we always do what we ourselves desire; and hence that would apply to the moralist’s actions as well as the desirist’s. “Desire” in this sense is equivalent to the agent’s motivation. 

M____’s complaint, then, is about what is motivating the desirist. Terminology can be confusing here because “desire” is also commonly used to refer to that. Thus, if I desired some chocolate, then “my desire” could refer either to my desire for chocolate or to what I desire, that is, the chocolate (or to eat the chocolate). “That is my desire, to eat some luscious chocolate!” But it could just as well be that “My heart’s desire is for all animal suffering to end!” So even though a desire may be mine, it need not be selfish at all, because that is determined by what I desire, which, confusingly, as I noted, is also commonly referred to as one’s desire. 

            Recognizing this double entendre also helps to explain some apparent contradictions. For example, you can want (desire) to go to the dentist because you have a toothache. However, you don’t want to go the dentist in the same way that you want to get rid of your toothache. The latter is substantive or psychological; the former is merely instrumental. In fact, substantively speaking, you don’t want to go the dentist, ever; but you do want to get rid of a toothache, always. 

            So a way to understand M____’s complaint is that the desirist would appear to be concerned first and foremost about their own wants; it is that that motivates the desirist. The moralist, on the other hand, will be motivated as much by what somebody else wants as by what they, the moralist themself, want. Therefore, saith M, you qua desirist would rationally consider how to keep the temperature at 70 in the face of the other person’s contrary desire, whereas you qua moralist would consider how to please both yourself and the other person.[1]

            My response to this, on behalf of desirism, is twofold. First, to reiterate, it need not be this way. It is perfectly possible that a desirist would want to please everyone or at least not only themself. Indeed there could even be an altruistic desirist who put their own desires aside altogether.

            M____ would reply: But it is not built into desirism that a desirist give a damn about others. A desirist might or might not. A desirist could be a thoroughgoing egoist. A moralist, however, is of necessity (that is, by definition) responsive to the desires (or interests or whatever) of others.

            The second part of my response is that ethics must be concerned not merely with ideals but with ideals that can realized. The prescriptive norms of ethics – what we ought to do, according to the moralist, or what desirism recommends we do – must somehow relate to the actual norms of human motivation. (“Ought” … or “recommends”… implies “can.”) It is my empirical hunch that, given rational reflection, human beings would generally accord some weight to the concerns of others … and, more specifically, not only as something impinging on one’s own desires, but also as something of importance to the other. We would not, however, come anywhere close, as a rule, to according others’ desires equal weight to our own. The absurdities of the utilitarian tsunami sweeping away any and all of our personal desires speak eloquently to this.

            In the case of the roommates, I imagine that the agent in control would, on reflection (including consultation with the other) in the preponderance of conceivable circumstances, have abundant reasons, both self-serving and other-concerned, for according substantial weight to the other’s preference, and so be motivated to work out a mutual accommodation (which could take any of several forms).

            Note further that it is fully compatible with desirism to support a political system that accords equality before the law, as well as equal entitlement to public services (e.g., from the fire department, from medical professionals), etc. Again one can easily imagine various motivations and of various kinds for such support, ranging from intrinsic attraction to the idea (for whatever contingent reasons having to do with one’s upbringing and experiences, etc.) to perception of equality’s instrumental value (for this or that purpose, again covering a wide range). 

            Finally, I would like to turn the tables on morality. My distinct impression is that, far from being more attuned to the needs of others than the desirist, moralists tend to be downright solipsistic. For the typical moralist believes not only that there is such a thing as objective right and wrong and good and bad, but also that, in any given situation, they themself are in the right or good. And this conviction or assumption arises, it seems to me, from their abject failure to appreciate that the person they oppose is a distinct individual from themself. In other words, the way a moralist sees things is the way things are, period. A desirist makes no such assumption.

[1] Strictly speaking M____ would not allow that an egoist could be rational. To me it is obvious that an egoist could be, since I conceive rationality as having to do with fitting means to ends, no matter whether those ends are self-serving or everyone-serving. I will put aside further consideration of this issue for the present discussion.

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