Of Telescopes and Herrings

Looking through the wrong end of the telescope

An extremely fundamental assumption in many if not all circumstances is that there is an answer to a question. I am most acutely aware of this basic fact of human nature in the context of my professional work as a philosopher, and more particularly still as an analytic ethicist. So for example it is presumed that there is an answer to every question of the sort, “What is the right thing to do?” The norm in normative ethics is to seek out some Supreme Principle of morality, from which can be derived all subsidiary principles and, finally, particular moral judgments (as answers to the questions about what to do). For example:

 

Supreme Principle: Never treat anyone simply as a means. (Kant’s categorical imperative)

Subsidiary principle (corollary): Never lie, i.e., It is wrong to lie (because lying involves treating someone merely as a means).

Particular judgment: Don’t lie to Alice, i.e., It would be, or was, wrong for me or you or Fred to lie to Alice.

 

Supreme Principle: Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. (The Golden Rule)

Subsidiary principle (corollary): Never lie, i.e., It is wrong to lie (since you would never want to be lied to).

Particular judgment: Don’t lie to Alice, i.e., It would be, or was, wrong for me or you or Fred to lie to Alice.

 

Supreme Principle: Always do what is for the best. (Utilitarianism)

Subsidiary principle (corollary): Never lie, i.e., It is wrong to lie (because lying invariable, or at least in general, leads to worse consequences overall than not lying); alternatively, lie only if and when it would be for the best.

Particular judgment: Don’t lie to Alice (because lying tends to lead to worse consequences overall, or because it would likely do so in this instance).

 

And so forth …

 

I wish to suggest that aiming for a Supreme Principle is looking through the wrong end of the telescope. The place to begin, I submit, is with moral judgments of which we are certain. Thus, I personally find myself “coming back” every time I think about the relevant issues to convictions such as the following:


No woman should have to carry a fetus to term against her will.

It is wrong to start a war.

It is unacceptable for a U.S. President to balk the peaceful transfer of power.

            Most ordinary uses of nonhuman animals by humans are unconscionable.

It is wrong to litter.

It would be wrong to lie to Alice in this instance.

And on and on …

 

            What, then, is the “next step” for someone who is genuinely concerned about morality or ethics? Hardly, I would say, to seek out a Supreme Principle of Morality! Rather: How can the states of affairs or world I want to exist be brought into being? This is a purely practical and empirical question, whose answer is likely infinitely elusive, given the extreme finiteness of human knowledge. Nevertheless, it is a more sensible question to be investigating than: What is the axiom from which all of my moral intuitions can be derived? Why is the latter a pointless question? Because I already know what my moral intuitions are: What I don’t know is how to implement them. So that is what I need to be “asking” about.

            Or, if I have not yet formed a clear intuition about what to do, then the way to proceed is not to delve into the bottomless pit of theoretical inquiry but rather to investigate the particulars of the issue at hand: What are the relevant facts? What are the reasons various people or factions have given for their conflicting answers? What solutions have been proposed? How might they be implemented? And so forth.

 

Red herring

Note one more thing: Even framing these matters as moral ones leads us astray. Frankly, I have no idea what “should” or “ought” means in the moral context. I think it's a red herring. What I do know (just as I know what my intuitions are without need of a Supreme Principle) is what I want. Though here again,  if I don’t yet know what I want, the way to find out is not to be trying to figure out what is the Right Thing to Do, but rather to investigate the relevant particulars. This process, in fact, is what I think of as the rational approach to figuring out what to do. I do endorse rationality, even as I recommend dispensing with morality. Thus, I would advise vetting our desires with study and reflection and experience. I also endorse the cultivation of compassion.

            Why do I “endorse” these things? Because I like them: They are key components of the kind of world I want to come into existence. Again, in the end it’s always about what I want … including my “meta-wants” that we cultivate reason (by vetting our wants or desires with study, reflection, and experience) and compassion.

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