Tracking

I have claimed that moral judgments can be replaced by statements of (rational) preferences, thereby removing the faux aura of objectivity from ethics (and thence also the ills that derive therefrom, chiefly the exacerbation of disagreements). I call the ethics of preferences “desirism.” I have also claimed that moralism is itself based on preferences (desires). This is an empirical claim.[1] So it leads to a prediction. Therefore it could, in theory, be tested.

            For example, it seems to me (and this was the original revelation that rescued my amoralism from despair) that my previously moral conviction that humans’ eating animals (human or otherwise) is (all other things equal) wrong, or that human beings (categorically) ought not to eat animals, was really only a double counting (to use Ronnie de Sousa’s wonderful term for it) of my strongly desiring that animals not be unduly harmed.

My prediction, then, is that moral judgments track existing desires. In other words, and despite morality’s reputation, and even supposed raison-d’être, of opposing our “inclinations,” I strongly suspect that whenever you find someone (sincerely) taking a firm moral stand, you will discover that their stand is consistent with some (strong) nonmoral desire of their own. Thus, you won’t find a so-called ethical vegan (that is, a vegan whose diet is due not just to personal health concerns but is directed at helping animals) who doesn’t care about animals.

Oh yes, that vegan (like myself) might also desire to eat animal foods. But there will be a stronger desire to spare animals from harm. If, however, a person’s love of animal food or convenience etc. were stronger than their compassion, then my prediction would be that they would not believe that it is wrong to eat animals.

This at one and the same time exposes the futility of moralism and holds open the promise of an effective amoralism.


[1] This implies a reversal of the presumed direction of moral disapproval, from disliking something because it is bad to judging something to be bad because one dislikes it. It is thus an empirical version of Socrates’ question to Euthyphro about piety and the gods: “The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.” The second disjunct -- pious (or impious) because loved (or hated) by the gods -- is analogous to my position -- right (or wrong) because liked (or disliked) by the moralist. Thus my position is at odds with Socrates’ presumed preference for the first disjunct.

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