Normative Ethics Reclaimed

One “casuality” of amorality as I conceive it has been normative ethics. I came to view it as akin to theology in being about nothing real. Normative ethics is usually conceived as the investigation of what is right or wrong or good or bad or the best way to live, etc. It is distinguished from meta-ethics, which investigates the meanings of these terms rather than their concrete content. For example, a meta-ethical theory might hold that the right thing to do is what we are unconditionally obligated to do, that is, not for any further reason; but then there could be distinct candidates for rightness in general terms, such as never treating anyone merely as a means or maximizing the good. Those latter would be examples of normative ethical theories. Since amorality is the denial of there being any such things as right and wrong etc. … that they are mythical, exactly on par with the categories of sinfulness and blessedness in the absence of God … normative ethics would seem to have no work to do at all … no more than sorcery as the concoction of magical formulae. 

Nevertheless I for one hold dear many concrete ideas about how I would like to live and how I would like to see everybody live, not only in the sense of our conditions (for example, healthy, politically free, etc.) but also in the sense of how we behave. That latter is the domain of normative ethics; yet I have wanted to avoid putting forward a specific normative ethics because, to me, that smacked too much of asserting (and “justifying”) a morality or issuing directives about how we ought to live. 

But now it occurs to me that perhaps I have been too scrupulous in my amoralism. Normative ethics is only a problem if one cedes meta-ethics to moralism. But that is precisely what I have not done. On the contrary, my amoralist thesis is precisely the meta-ethical thesis that ethics need not be about morality. I have proposed instead an amoral ethics, which I have called desirism. 

And so it now seems to me that there would be no harm at all in my proposing an amoral or desirist normative ethics. In fact, I happen to be very fond of several of the existing normative ethics. I am especially enamored of Kantian ethics, but I also see much to applaud in utilitarianism and even in ethical egoism, as well as virtue theory, and no doubt others besides. 

There remains a critical difference, however, between moralist and amoralist, and in particular desirist, normative ethics. Moralist normative ethics seeks to discover general principles, and ideally a single Supreme Principle from which all more particular guidance can be derived, that are universal in their application, and which have the status of objective truths that generate categorical imperatives. My kind of normative ethics does none of that. Even though the very same principles may “make an appearance,” they do so in the form of recommendations or preferences that have survived rational scrutiny. As such they are most likely to be multiple and relative. Furthermore, there will be maxims of more and less generality, and which may or may not cohere. You could say they constitute a wisdom literature rather than an algorithm for generating correct answers to ethical questions. 

Thus for example I would encourage myself and others to cultivate both reason and compassion, to be kind because everyone is fighting a hard battle, to (as the default) treat all sentient beings as we ourself would wish to be treated while being alert to everyone’s varying needs and desires and circumstances, to value honesty, mindfulness, not rushing … and be sure to use dental floss. But I would see it as quite foolish and just plain pointless to attempt to reconcile all of these with one another with mathematical precision or even to avoid outright contradiction, and to insist that everyone ought to embrace these same values. All I know is that, at this point in time and after a lifetime of experience and study and reflection, these are things I hold dear and wish everybody did. 

Furthermore they motivate me to behave accordingly, as regards both aligning myself with their guidance and striving to influence others to do so. It is also especially to be noted that their status as “merely” subjective preferences does not imply for one second that I will turn a blind eye to others’ behaving in ways I don’t like, not even out of respect for them. Call that contradicting one of my own values, if you will; but, again, that would not bother me unduly. And I’m not even sure it’s a contradiction; for example, I do not, if only because I cannot, deny Hitler the “right” to desire to exterminate me as much as I would desire he not do so. So in this sense I “respect” him as I would wish to be respected. But that would not prevent me from trying to stop him. After all, that’s what it means to desire something: It motivates you.

Note: See also "My Ethics."