Two Steps

Desirism consists of two basic steps, which can be articulated variously. For instance: 

1.      Interrogate your moral beliefs.

2.      Interrogate your nonmoral desires.

What I am getting at by this formulation is that in the beginning we are filled with various moral beliefs, which, according to desirism, are bogus, superfluous, and noxious. Therefore the first step is to deconstruct them into what I claim are their actual source, which is something we (nonmorally) desire. For example, if you believe that people ought not to eat meat, my claim is that this is your way of embellishing your desire that people not eat meat (or more generally, your compassionate desire that other animals be let alone). (The function, largely unaware, of this embellishing is to raise your desire in stature so as to increase its chances of being satisfied.) Just so also, if you believe that people ought to be free to eat meat as they please, then I would strongly suspect the true source of this belief is your desire to keep on eating the meat you enjoy. So what the first step is suggesting is that you will discover this by asking yourself, “Why do I think people ought (not) to x?” The answer, I predict (at least after a thorough study of my theory!), will be because you desire that they (not) do x. 

But if that were all amoralism left us with, I doubt I or most people would like the result. Therefore I devised a positive ethics that stipulates a second step, which is, having demoralized our desires, let us now rationalize them. (I could have called this rationalism, but since the whole theory hinges on desires, I called it desirism.) The point here is simply that just because we happen to want or like something does not mean we would continue to do so (or with the same intensity) if we reflected on its actual implications for our life and the lives of others or other things we care about or value (i.e., desire or like). So here again we could ask ourselves a question, “Why do I want or desire x?” Answering this question implicitly invites rational scrutiny of our desires, since it involves examining our reasons, which may be good or bad reasons in the sense of how they stand up to inquiry into relevant facts and likely consequences. 

So for example, your desire to eat meat would ideally be confronted with facts about animal sentience, how animals are actually treated in the food production process, the effects of this process on the environment, and the effects of this diet on your health. As a result your desire  might be eliminated (in the sense of an operational motivation, since the enjoyment of meat could well remain even though you would no longer act on it, just as you might enjoy having sex with someone but would not force yourself upon her) or at least adjusted in some way, such as to eat meat more sparingly and only from certain sources. 

In the same spirit, then, the two steps can be articulated thus: 

1.      Demoralize your desires.

1.      Rationalize your desires.

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