The Scylla and Charybdis of Moralism

Morality as I conceive it involves the existence of and belief in objective truths about right and wrong, good and bad, etc. To disambiguate we can speak of the belief in objective values as moralism and the existence of objective values as morality proper; hence moralism is the belief in morality. The nature of moralism thus defined has two interestingly opposite consequences for the ethical life and society: 

1)  On the one hand, moralists tend to hold their beliefs with absolute and unshakeable conviction. (This assertion could be taken as a mere stipulation, so that it is true only analytically, in the way bachelors are unmarried. In this case “moralist” would take on a connotation or even distinct meaning from “moralist” in the stringent and simple sense of one who believes in morality. However, since I believe, as a matter of empirical fact, that moralism in the stringent sense tends to generate moralism in the robust sense, I don’t worry too much about this ambiguity or conflation.) 

2) On the other hand, because there are always arguments on both (or more) sides of a moral issue, consensus or even decision can prove indefinitely elusive. 

            I take these two consequences to speak in favor of desirism over moralism. A desirist does not fret over which is the correct answer to a moral question because there are no such answers because morality does not exist. Yet it is quite possible, and I would say the norm, for a desirist to be able to form and sustain robust desires or motivations. By the same token, a desirist cannot believe they are in possession of the correct answer. Nevertheless, again, it is a simple empirical fact that, even after the rational vetting that desirism stipulates, a desirist is able to form and sustain robust desires or motivations. Thus instead of the Scylla of intransigence (leading to intense and unending conflict) and the Charybdis of irresolution (leading to persistence of the status quo), the desirist has the best of both worlds of moderation (supporting tolerance and understanding) and decision (facilitating change and supporting commitment).

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