Metaethics without Question Begging: an excursus in metametaethics

Meta-ethics seeks to answer the question: What is ethics? I myself take ethics to be the inquiry into how to live. But, consistently, I believe, with other so-called moral error theorists, I argue that this inquiry cannot be simply presumed to be asking “How ought we to live?” That way of phrasing the question seems to me to imply that the answer must be some kind of moralism.[1] But this begs the question, since moralism is precisely what I, as a thoroughgoing amoralist, reject. I hold that morality, as normally conceived, is an illusion; indeed, this is a subset of the larger illusion that there are objective values. Furthermore, as a moral abolitionist, I believe that this illusion is largely baneful to the world most of us, on reflection, would desire. Therefore I recommend eliminating or suppressing the belief in morality, or, in a word, vanquishing moralism. So instead of “How ought we to live?” I am offering an answer to what I consider to be the proper question for ethics to ask: “How shall one live?” 

But suppressing moralism is not enough, by my lights: It is also necessary to offer a positive prescription. The mere elimination of moralism, while perhaps beneficial up to a point, could go very badly (for our jointly desired prospects) if left without anything to pick up the slack. There are some who argue that natural human compassion and the like would suffice to put us on the right track. Moralism would then be seen as an impediment to the right way to live, so once removed, life would proceed largely benignly. I have some sympathy for that point of view. But I have advocated one stipulation to make this outcome more likely, namely, that we reflect before acting. 

I admit that what I mean by “reflect” has become ever more packed with components as I myself have reflected on the subject. Originally I thought it sufficed to say that it meant simply to be rational in the standard way of being logical and also sensitive to probabilities. But even that presumes being generally informed, as well as informed about any specific question in view, and also experienced in relevant ways. So now I would characterize reflection as consideration (of how to act or feel or even believe) in light of due attention to relevant information based on experience, reasoning, study, dialogue, and the like. 

Of course the result in any given case will still be subjective and relative. Thus, you may go through this process and decide (be motivated, recommend,[2] etc.) to do x, or simply do (or believe, etc.) x, while I may go through it and decide (etc.) to do, or simply do (etc.) not-x. But that is all I think ethics could ask of us: that we have performed this due diligence. I would like to think that, if carried out by people in general (but also even by any individual regardless of whether others do likewise), life would go better. Not perfectly by any means – just better (as regards our personal or society’s collective considered desires). 

All of the above, then, is what I have been calling “desirism.”[3] And so it has seemed to me to be a metaethical thesis, since it is an answer to the question, “How shall one live?” Previously I had assumed[4] that desirism therefore precludes normative ethics altogether because, if there are no objective values, a thesis desirism is premised on,[5] there are no norms to prescribe.  But then I realized I had gone too far.[6] After all, a central thesis of mine has been that standard metaethics goes too far in assuming that ethics has to be about morality. I consider desirism itself to be an ethics, which is to say, an answer to the question, “How shall one live?” Therefore there is room for a normative ethics that recommends, without requiring, how to live; so ethics can be hortatory without being “commanding.” 

However, I subsequently realized that there would then be some unclarity about where exactly desirism itself falls. Since desirism is a variety of moral abolitionism, and moral abolitionism is generally taken to be a metaethical thesis, I assumed that desirism must be too. But I am wondering whether the dividing line between metaethics and normative ethics belongs closer to the former. In other words, might it make more sense to think of desirism itself as a normative ethics? Thus, it would be offered as an alternative to ethical theories like utilitarianism and Kantianism, since they are moralist; they seek to prescribe what everyone must do. Desirism instead advises us only to reflect before acting, with the explicit understanding that how one then acts, or what one then recommends, will have no claim to absolute truth not to mention obligation.[7] 

Kantianism offers a precedent for this way of collapsing a very general thesis with a more particular one. Thus, the theory both stipulates that ethics is univocal and categorical and then offers a particular formulation (actually several, although claimed to be coincident) of what “the” categorical imperative is (for example, Never treat anyone merely as a mean). All of this commonly comes under the rubric of normative ethics. But it is telling us two things: (1) ethics is moralistic, that is, deals in absolute obligations (and the like) and (2) our obligation is such-and-such. Analogously, desirism is a double thesis about what to do: (1) put aside moralism and (2) reflect before acting. 

Alternatively one might take moralism and moral abolitionism to be the two categories of normative ethics, with Kantianism a subcategory of the first and desirism of the second.[8] Note that this would then place other answers to the “Now what?” question posed by moral error theory in the first category, since they all maintain that moral nihilism is compatible with a more or less moralistic attitude.[9] 

An interesting question would then be whether an ethical theory is self-referential. Specifically, do moralistic theories stipulate that moralism itself, or their version of it, is a moral demand, and amoralistic theories that amoralism, or their version of it, is not? Thus, I doubt that Kant would have allowed that there is no obligation to be moral.[10] And as regards desirism or any other moral abolitionism, I have always pointed out the trap of insisting that people forsake moralism. 

Some error theorists try to wiggle out of this precisely by arguing that moral nihilism is not a normative theory but a metaethical one, and hence that it is being put forward as something that is true rather than morally required. But I, as a thoroughgoing normative nihilist (or subjectivist about value), would maintain that truth itself is a norm, that is, a standard by which we judge things; and hence I opt for an alethic abolitionism, which discourages making assertions of any kind, whether moral, metaethical, or otherwise.[11] Thus, my very objection to being moralistic about moralism is intended only as a recommendation (or an exhortation, if you will, since I feel strongly about it); moreover, in good desirist fashion, I strive to back it up with reflective reasons. 

In summary, then, my recommendation for conceptual bookkeeping in ethics is as follows: 

1.     Metaethics: asks “How shall one live?” (or “How shall we live?” for any group) and may be conceptualized as soliciting either assertoric or only hortatory answers

2.     Normative ethics: offers candidate answers to the above in the broadest terms

2.1.  Moralisms

2.1.1.     Consequentialist?

2.1.1.1.         Consequentialisms

2.1.1.1.1.              Utilitarianism

2.1.1.1.2.              Egoism

2.1.1.2.         Nonconsequentialisms

2.1.1.2.1.              Kantianism

2.1.2.     Hard?

2.1.2.1.         Hard moralisms: presume moral realism

2.1.2.2.         Soft moralisms: presume moral error theory

2.1.2.2.1.              Fictionalism

2.1.2.2.2.              Conservationism

2.2.  Moral abolitionisms

2.2.1.     Strictly negative

2.2.2.     Additional features

2.2.2.1.         Desirism: recommends vetting of one’s beliefs and desires 

Beyond this, there is the host of particular questions, of varying degrees of generality and specificity, calling for guidance in how to live and what to do, which would be approached in the manner of the respective theories (e.g., Kantianism would have us derive a specific injunction from a categorical imperative and then summon up our will power to carry it out, whereas desirism would have us reflect on our own nonmoral beliefs and desires regarding the situation and, in due course, be thereby motivated to act). 

Of particular note is that the desirist is free to act in accordance with any of the moralist principles so long as they are conceived nonmoralistically. So for example, a desirist might find themself motivated, after due reflection, to do as a consequentialist principle prescribed on some occasion and as a nonconsequentialist principle prescribed on another. In neither case would the desirist feel they were doing what was objectively required of them (not to mention, everyone).

[1] I tend to use this word to denote the belief in morality, as well as the attitudes and institutions that belief grounds. The more common usage is of an excessive moralism. I have argued that the former generally leads to the latter, which is one reason why I recommend dispensing with all moralism.

[2] Note that what one recommends may diverge from what one would do oneself, since recommending is itself a form of acting. So for example, an egoist might, after due reflection, decide to tell a lie to protect themself but advise someone else in the same kind of situation to tell the truth because, after due reflection, they want to get the other person in trouble.

[3] Or, strictly speaking, ethical desirism. There is also psychological desirism, which is my thesis that what we believe we morally ought to do is usually grounded in what we nonmorally desire.

[4] The word “assume” is often used where, strictly speaking, an inference has taken place. I won’t worry about that distinction. Let “assume” cover inferences that have become habitual and hence are sometimes ripe for further Socratic examination.

[5] Or at the very least desirism is premised on the thesis that it is better not to believe that there are or to act as if there were.

[6] See “Normative Ethics Reclaimed” in my book Ethical Health (pp. 99-101).

[7] I tend to think of desirism itself as something I only recommend or happen to believe in after due reflection. I think it is an open question whether a utilitarian or a Kantian would be so “amoralist” about their ethics.

[8] A precedent for this would be dividing normative ethics into consequentialist and nonconsequentialist theories.

[9] Thus they would be “soft moralisms,” analogous to soft determinism about free will.

[10] A contemporary exemplar of this self-referentially moral way of thinking among philosophical ethicists has been Ronald Dworkin. See his 1996 paper, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe it” in Philosophy & Public Affairs, 25(2), 87–139. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2961920 .

[11] This is how to avoid the pitfall of classic skepticism, which seems to contradict itself in asserting a universal skepticism. Whether such a stance is practicable is a further question. Some traditions deal with this by mocking human aspirations to get anything right; cf. Taoism and Zen. But I am one of several philosophers who find the matter quite tractable, by analogy with how moral abolitionists offer ways of dealing with everyday issues of ethics (see e.g. Ethan Moore’s forthcoming collection from Routledge), contra the Dostoevskian bogeyman that without the belief in God and immortality (and hence morality), “everything is permissible.”

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