Psychological Desirism

In the normal order of things, it is thought that the proper character or second nature we ought to strive to form is whatever is in accordance with morality. Human beings naturally desire or like many things that morality would approve, such as being truthful and not harming others gratuitously. But we also have mean and selfish streaks in us, so morality is presumed to bring these into conformity with itself. Thus the proper sequence is to know or figure out what is right or good, and then to cultivate virtuous attitudes that accord with these judgments. For example, if you come to realize that it is wrong to eat meat because it causes great and unnecessary harm to other sentient creatures, then, if you did not particularly care about other animals, it would make sense to cultivate your empathy and compassion for them. 

It might have been the case that you simply did not know about the awful treatment of other animals in the food production process, or simply had never thought about it, and then, once you learned, you were naturally motivated to opt out of eating them by means of your already- existing empathy and compassion. But it could also be the case that you did know but just didn’t care that much. That is the kind of case I’m talking about, such that morality counsels cultivation of sensitivity. And the main reason for this counsel is simply practical: You are more likely to stick to a moral resolve if you are motivated not just to do the right thing as a general principle but also by an intrinsic desire to do it in the particular sort of case. So a moral animal lover will be more likely to go vegetarian than a moral agent with the same belief (that eating other animals is wrong) but who just doesn’t care that much about them. 

Given all of that, however, it seems to me that the cultivation of empathy and compassion could function in the same way without the middle man of morality. Morality is just along for the ride, so to speak. The real work is being done by (nonmoral) desire. I call this thesis psychological desirism. So I would infer that any person whose moral convictions regarding a certain matter are strong and reliable, as attested not just by verbal proclamations but mainly by their consistent actions over a long period, would have, mainly or even exclusively, corresponding nonmoral desires to thank for it. 

What I call ethical desirism is the recommendation to drop the moral talk altogether, and instead of trying to figure out what right and wrong and good and bad mean in moral terms, use reason and other reflective means, including experience, study, and dialogue, to vet one’s nonmoral desires. So for meat-eating: Investigate how meat is typically produced and what human nutritional needs are and what nonanimal resources are available to your health and taste buds and so forth. Voilà: I predict you will be more likely to give up eating them. 

The moralist will object that the cultivation of moral motivation (being moved to do the right thing because it is the morally right thing to do) makes more sense because it fills the gaps left by insufficient caring in all realms of life. Supplementing it with caring wouldn’t hurt, of course; but it would be foolish simply to substitute caring for obligation. 

This is an empirical issue, so I cannot answer definitively. However I can, as a philosopher, make the logical point that moral motivation also has downsides, and it is these which may tip the scales in favor of dumping it altogether. Moral motivation, or what I call moralism, objectifies (as a truth or “command”) what is really subjective (a desire); and that conceptual or cognitive “move” makes helpful change or compromise less likely, thereby exacerbating stagnation and conflict. 

So my recommendation is to flip the direction of causation in your thinking about how morality operates: It is more likely that one’s nonmoral desires cause one to hold the moral beliefs one does than that one’s moral beliefs cause one to do what they say one ought. Or at a minimum: One’s moral beliefs will be motivating to the degree that they are consistent with one’s nonmoral desires. And given that moral beliefs also introduce dangerous ingredients into the motivational brew, and, I would argue, are wholly fanciful and possibly even nonsensical to boot, I advise chucking them and sticking with one’s nonmoral desires duly vetted.

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