Smile

Although I no longer believe there is such a thing as objective morality, I still have strong desires that my life and “the world” be certain ways that morality is often conceived as promoting.[1] Thus, I would like all human beings to be happy and caring and at peace, and all nonhuman animals to be let alone by us to live their natural lives. There is then the traditional question of ethics: “How then shall I (or we) live?” As I have set up the picture, this is a question about means to ends. Some ethicists would leave out the “then” and ask the question directly, on the assumption that certain ways of being (behaving, feeling, etc.) have inherent worth, regardless of what consequences they may have. I have a great deal of sympathy for that idea, since there are virtues I definitely value “in themselves,” like honesty and rationality and compassion; but in the end my hunch is that these virtues have first proved their mettle by being useful for our desired ends. So I will stick with an instrumental view of ethics as inquiring about how to behave and feel in order to achieve the world we desire. 

Notice, then, that an amoral (or “moral nihilist”) view of things can support the same goals and means as a moralist view and hence offer an ethics. It has therefore been an unwarranted assumption that ethics must be about morality. Metaethics allows for conceptions of ethics that in turn allow for amoral ways of living. It follows further that normative ethics can accommodate general principles of living that are amoralist. From these principles could then be derived more particular guidance regarding what to do on particular occasions. And, again, there is nothing at all to prevent these from being identical to those of some morality. 

But note that none of this need be conceived as strictly algorithmic. That is a degree of precision which is not suitable to ethics, according to my metaethics.[2] There is simply too much that would need to be known, and too great a diversity of desires, to expect real human beings in real situations to live according to exceptionless rules. Nevertheless useful guidance is sought. Sometimes this will be in the form of “rules of thumb.” Note also, therefore, that nothing prevents principles that are commonly thought to be incompatible, such as those that are consequentialist and those that are nonconsequentialist, from being part of the mix of one person’s or one group’s ethics. It is only when an ethical principle is conceived moralistically that it demands the kind of absolutist allegiance that would rule out accommodating an “opposite” principle. Thus, I myself, as an amoralist, feel perfectly content to have both utilitarian and Kantian intuitions and “urges.” The ethics I call desirism then calls on me simply to do due diligence in vetting my urges and the beliefs that support them before acting on the resultant motivation.[3] That, I believe, is the sum total of what ethics asks of us. 

The fact that this procedure will lead to different and even conflicting motivations in different people is a bullet I am prepared to bite, especially since it won’t prevent me from acting in opposition to a person who ends up being motivated differently from me. But that is no different from the situation between moralists who disagree, except that, I believe, conflicts between amoralists will tend to be fewer and less intense than those between moralists, precisely because the amoralists do not accord absolutist significance to their principles but conceive them only as something desired. But feel them and act on them they still will, since that is exactly what desires do. 

The moralist will sputter: “But that is exactly why we need morality! To curb our acting on certain desires. You amoralists give free rein to whatever you happen to desire!” But this is why I have formulated desirism, which calls for vetting or reflecting on our desires (and beliefs) before “giving them free rein.” But that in the end we act on our desires (ceteris paribus) is true of everyone, including the moralist, since this is just what it means to desire or to act. Ethics, as I conceive it, is therefore simply about making sure our desires pass reflective muster. 

As an example of what an amoral normative ethics can offer, I propose the following rule of thumb, or, you could say, recommendation but not commandment: Smile.[4] By this I refer not only to a facial expression but also to its underlying attitude. A particular kind of situation that prompts this recommendation is when you accede to someone else’s request, however reluctantly, but retain a scowl on your face. Under certain circumstances this puts an utterly unnecessary damper on an otherwise pleasant occasion. This works in two ways: by sustaining your own grumpiness and by undercutting the benefit to the other that your accession brings about. There are countless social situations, especially in intimate settings, where the scowl serves no useful purpose but only a counterproductive one. 

A moralist would certainly object to this injunction to smile as overlooking equally countless occasions where it could indeed serve some useful purpose to retain the scowl. This would be analogous to the joke about the singing telegram: “Your sister Rose is dead.” Sometimes it is simply not suitable to sing, or be jolly, or even pleasant. Just so, it can be very important to continue to indicate your disapproval of some action that you agree to perform for whatever reason. 

But this is precisely why I offer recommendations or rules of thumb only. I have experienced enough occasions where I or someone else has maintained a scowl in lieu of a smile to ill effect, that I feel strongly about urging us all to smile as our default facial expression (even when alone, given William James’s observation that we will come to feel the way we behave as if we felt; so if you are feeling gloomy, smile and you may find you begin to feel happy). So I advise smiling … but not if it kills you! 😊[5]

[1] And this is not a coincidence on my view, since I believe moral beliefs are undergirded by nonmoral desires.

[2] And Aristotle’s: "We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better" (The Nicomachean Ethics, bk 1, ch. 3, tr. William David Ross).

[3] This also amounts to your being able to give reasons for your motivations, thereby making the procedure rational. “Unexamined” desires may more appropriately be called mere causes.

[4] This is actually my Second Recommendation, Listen being the first. Cf. “What Happened?”

[5] Another rule of thumb I recommend is to abstain from regret, where I think the case can be made to follow the advice without exception. Cf. “The Real Meaning of Regret” in Moments (KDP 2022).

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