The Sting of Free Will

 Introspecting or examining myself phenomenologically (which is usually where I get my inspirations), it seems to me that if I find myself in disagreement with someone, whether it be morally, factually, aesthetically, you name it, I want them to agree with me. This, by the usual moralist alchemy or psycho-logic, then transmutes into my thinking they ought to share my opinion or taste or preference or whatever; and so they are wrong not to. This also implies that I see them as willfully disagreeing with me, since moral ascriptions presume free will. And this is what gives feelings of others being immoral, or irrational, or ignorant, or philistines, etc., their sting. That's why I see all responses to disagreement, that is, of any category, as of a moralistic piece.

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